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Abstract
How much does imprecision in accounting measurement enhance value?
by
Ying Liang

Adviser: Professor Masako N. Darrough

Theory on real effects suggests that more precise accounting does not necessarily improve
investment efficiency. However, with investment efficiency mostly unobservable, empirical assessment of the theory is rare. This paper develops an empirical framework based on Kanodia
et al. (2005) to structurally estimate the effect of imprecision in accounting measurement on
investment efficiency. My estimates suggest that imprecision in accounting measurement has
mitigated over-investment in capital expenditures and R&D by 28.6% and 4.9%, respectively.
On average, firms still over-invest relative to the first-best full-information benchmark. In
counterfactual analyses, my estimates suggest that the optimal investment efficiency could
be achieved by reducing the current accounting precision by 4 percentage points (19.5 percentage points) in capital expenditures (R&D), which would increase investor welfare by
4.2% (22%). My study is among the first to provide a quantitative assessment of real effects
and presents early evidence of excessive precision in accounting measurement.
This dissertation consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the research question
and discusses the related literature. Chapter 2 presents the general model as well as three
benchmark cases. Chapter 3 describes the data and estimation method. Chapter 4 presents
parameter estimates, assesses the model’s fit with the data, and provides validation tests.
Chapter 4 also examines the effects of altering accounting precision on the firm’s investment efficiency, on residual information uncertainty, and on the firm’s shareholders and the
market’s welfare. The last chapter concludes.
iv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Accounting measurements and disclosure rules have significant effects on firms’ real investment decisions. This relationship is referred to as the real-effects theory (Kanodia, 2006;
Kanodia and Sapra, 2016). One interesting finding in this literature is on the imprecision
of accounting measurement. Because of the inescapable judgments, conventions and subjectivities involved in the application of accounting standards, most accounting measurements
are imprecise. Both the FASB and the IASB view reducing the imprecision as one of their
objectives.1 However, Kanodia et al. (2005) suggest that a certain degree of imprecision in
measuring firms’ investments can be value-enhancing. The intuition is rooted in the postulate
of the second-best theory (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956): when there are two market frictions,
for example, asymmetric information about both profitability and investment in this case,
resolving one of the two could do more harm than good. More specifically, when profitability
is only observable to the firm manager and investment is precisely measured, expecting that
the market interprets high investment as high profitability, a firm will over-invest to signal
its profitability, resulting in a loss in economic welfare.2 An imprecise investment measure
weakens the market’s response to investment, reducing the firm’s incentive to over-invest.
Excess imprecision is not ideal, either. If the market price is no longer sensitive to investment
because the investment measure is too noisy, without the incentive from the market, the firm
will invest in a myopic way, leading to under-investment. Therefore, there is an optimal level
of imprecision in accounting measurement, in which the investment is made as if there is no
1

The FASB currently adopts cost-benefit analysis to evaluate a proposed standard, and one of potential benefits that the FASB would assess is whether changes to accounting and financial reporting would
“accurately and neutrally reflect the underlying economic transactions and events”. The chairman of the
IASB, Hans Hoogervorst also stated in a speech (Hoogervorst, 2012), that “Although we know that some of
the imprecision and ambiguity I mentioned before is inevitable, it is our job to push back the grey areas in
accounting as far as possible.”
2
See also other applications of the signaling role of investment in the real effects literature, e.g., Spence
(1974); Sapra (2002); Beyer and Guttman (2012); Bertomeu and Cheynel (2015); Gao and Jiang (2018).

1

information asymmetry.
Despite their broad intuitive appeal, real effects models are difficult to test. Investment
decisions may be made in an economy described by the real-effects theory, where more
information could distort decision-making. Investment decisions may also be made in a
simple “Robinson Crusoe” economy where prices are exogenous,3 where more information
improves decision-making (Demski, 1973). When these two types of investments co-exist in
the data, distinguishing them becomes a major roadblock for empirical research. Moreover,
even if one can identify investments made under the real-effects theory, it is difficult to
conclude from data whether signal precision levels are above or below the optimal level. For
this reason, most empirical research to date has focused on documenting real consequences
from information dissemination.4 There is little evidence on the implications of the realeffects theory for optimal accounting precision.
My study employs structural estimation to link the real-effects theory to the empirical
literature. Structural estimation incorporates theoretical restrictions required to identify a
firm’s decision problem, thereby allowing me to quantify the potential loss in investment
efficiency when information precision about investment varies. It also allows me to answer
questions beyond the scope of theory: Do firms in general under- or over-invest? And would
an increase in accounting precision improve or hurt investors’ welfare? By fitting empirical
data to the model and obtaining parameter estimates, I can apply these estimates to study
counterfactual situations, including a completely precise measurement scenario, as well as
the first-best scenario with full information.
3

The Robinson Crusoe Economy refers to an economy with two agents, one of which is a consumer, and
the other is a producer. There are two goods produced in the economy. Both agents are price-takers. It is
a simple framework used in the study in economics.
4
For instance, Biddle et al. (2009) document both reduction of over-investment and under-investment
following a reduction of information asymmetry; Shroff (2017) examines the effects of forty-nine changes in
GAAP on firm investment decisions. Some paper also study the role of reporting frequency on investment
but come to different conclusions (Ernstberger et al., 2017; Kraft et al., 2018; Fu et al., 2019; Kajüter et al.,
2019; Nallareddy et al., 2017).
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A clear link between theory and empirical measurements of real effects is crucial to
accounting standard setting. The real-effects theory is acknowledged as one of the overriding
criteria to evaluate potential accounting rules, but in practice, standard setters rarely use the
theory to conduct economic analyses (Glover, 2014). This is partly due to the difficulties with
empirical measurement, which render the real-effects theory untestable and largely ignored.
As a result, standard-setting has been marred by debates about whether accounting can
suitably address the challenges caused by asymmetric information. In comparison to other
forms of public policy evaluations that are based on welfare assessments, accounting standard
setting lags behind in connecting theoretical models and empirical analysis to policy making.5
I start with a simple investment model in an overlapping generation setting that is closely
anchored on Kanodia et al. (2005). The firm manager makes investment decisions on behalf
of current shareholders. Investment generates both short-term and long-term revenues, both
of which are linear in investment amount and profitability. Profitability is only observable
to the manager, and investment is reported to the capital market but measured with noise.
The current shareholders have to sell the firm before the long-term profit is realized. The
manager chooses investment to maximize the firm price instead of terminal cash flows. This
implies that given the firm’s private information, the price-maximizing investment policies
need not be value-maximizing. In other words, price efficiency does not necessarily lead to
economic efficiency.
The capital market sets the price of the firm according to an imprecise report of investment. The quality of the investment report depends entirely on the accounting standards,
and the manager has no discretion to manipulate the report. The degree of imprecision in
the investment report is the primary variable of interest in my estimation. After estimating
the parameters, I conduct counterfactual analysis to calculate the degree of imprecision that
5

Research on economic public policing is abundant. To name a few, see industrial organization (Gentzkow,
2007), labor (Autor et al., 2014; Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007), monetary policy (Clarida et al., 2000; Mankiw
and Reis, 2002), and international trade (Trefler, 1993).

3

would achieve optimal investment efficiency. This optimal degree of imprecision provides a
benchmark to evaluate the imprecision estimated from data (i.e., too high or too low?).
To estimate the model, I collect data on stock returns, earnings, and investment and
use simulated method of moments (SMM) to match moments from the model and those
from the data. SMM simulates a dataset from the model solution from which selected
moments are calculated for every possible parameter set. The optimal parameter values
will return moments that best line up with those calculated using the empirical sample.
With the parameter estimates, I conduct a series of counterfactual analyses to evaluate the
effect of imprecision on over-investment and provide quantitative policy guidance to improve
investment efficiency.
My estimation shows that the measurement imprecision accounts for 32% of the sample variation in capital expenditure, and 16.2% of R&D sample variation. Compared to a
precise investment measure, the imprecision in the data mitigates over-investment by 28.6%
in capital investment and 4.9% in R&D, implying that improving the quality of investment
measurement will make firms significantly worse-off. Contrary to conventional wisdom, my
result suggests that investment efficiency would be improved by reducing measurement precision about investments. The first-best level of investment efficiency is implemented by
decreasing measurement imprecision by 4 percentage points for capital expenditures and by
19.5 percentage points for R&D. As noted in real effects theories (Kanodia and Sapra, 2016),
more information is not always preferred. My result shows that, although using the optimal
imprecision will cause a loss of information, firm values would rise by 4.2% for the capital
expenditures sample and 22% for the R&D sample. These findings suggest that accounting
measurement has a first-order effect on firm values through investment decisions.
My paper contributes to the literature in two main aspects. First, I attempt to address
the call in Kanodia and Sapra (2016) for more study of predictions from the real-effects
models. As a starting point, my study uses structural estimation to assess the real effects
4

of imprecision in accounting measurement and provides directional guidance toward optimal
investment efficiency. I also extend the model to obtain various measurements, such as the
distance between current and optimal investment, the effect of over-investment on the firm
and the investors’ welfare, and the loss of information due to accounting imprecision.
Second, the paper provides an empirical implementation of evaluating investment efficiency. I use the general approach of the real-effects models that focuses on managers
maximizing prices. The objective of this study is to capture one plausible first-order tradeoff. With the assumptions about functional forms and investment horizons, the model yields
mostly closed-form estimates that can be applied to many empirical settings. Also, the estimation only requires a moderate amount of computation and builds on pre-existing models
whose trade-offs are well-understood. Nevertheless, I recognize that, by trying to adhere to
a particular real-effects model as tightly as possible, I do not incorporate other empirical
features nor other trade-offs in real-effects models. It would be challenging to write a model
that reflects all such complexities, and future work on this general problem can build on my
model and help facilitate the understanding of the quantitative implications of real effects.
The real-effects literature starts with Kanodia (1980) and has grown substantially to
incorporate various aspects of accounting features, including accounting conservatism (Gigler
et al., 2009), hedge accounting (Melumad et al., 1999; Sapra, 2002; Gigler et al., 2007), markto-market accounting (Plantin et al., 2008; Allen and Carletti, 2008), alternative accounting
measurement methods (Liang and Wen, 2007; Bertomeu and Cheynel, 2015), auditing (Lu
and Sapra, 2009; Chen et al., 2019), and reporting choices (Gao and Jiang, 2018; Kanodia
et al., 2004; Dutta and Nezlobin, 2017). There are two typical assumptions in the realeffects framework: first, the firm’s manager has superior information over the market when
corporate decisions are made; and second, the manager maximizes the firm’s short-term price
instead of terminal cash flows.
Most of the empirical accounting literature on investment efficiency uses exogenous vari5

ations in financial reporting quality such as accounting disclosure, financial reporting efficiency, and transparency. The objective of this literature, as surveyed in Kothari et al.
(2010) and Roychowdhury et al. (2019), parallels mine in this paper, but the exact question
answered by these studies is very different. Their main focus is on whether accounting generates desirable or undesirable economic consequences. This is different from what accounting
theory refers to as real effects, since economic consequences can occur without the interaction between stock prices and firm decisions – the essential feature of real-effects theory.
Unfortunately, finding an exogenous variation in price incentives that could render a clean
reduced-form assessment of real effects is very difficult. Furthermore, the existing empirical papers mainly speak to real effects within the scope of observed variation, sometimes
after a regulation has been enforced (Hope and Thomas, 2008; Chuk, 2013). Although my
approach is less precise as a result of its assumptions on functional forms, it allows me to
provide counterfactual analyses to evaluate a proposed policy before it is put in place.
To my knowledge, the only prior paper that quantitatively examines the real effect of
imprecision on investment decision is Liang et al. (2019). They study a dynamic setting
with information asymmetry on productivity shock as well as managerial myopia. The
fundamental difference between their paper and this one is that in their paper, the market
observes a perfectly measured investment and an imprecise report on earnings. They also
develop and calibrate a dynamic model to evaluate the magnitude of real effects, while I use
a simple over-lapping generation model and employ SMM to estimate the parameters. The
stylized model allows me to compare the current equilibrium to several benchmark cases in
closed forms, and conduct counterfactual policy analyses to provide insight on the optimal
accounting precision to achieve first-best investment efficiency.
Several studies have used structural estimation to quantify the effect of accounting on
investment. Two important papers in this area are Terry (2018) and Terry et al. (2018).
Both studies estimate a multi-period investment model of strategic accounting choice, and
6

examine how accounting choices affect firm growth. These studies also build on insights
from the existing finance literature, including capital market misvaluation, adjustment costs,
and agency problems (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006; Warusawitharana and Whited, 2016;
Hennessy and Whited, 2007; Nikolov and Whited, 2014). This literature is more ambitious as
they aim at fully understanding dynamic investment patterns. However, the questions asked
in these models are different, as they do not model the interactions between endogenous prices
and the subsequent investment inefficiencies. I analyze a much simpler myopic investment
model in order to explicitly solve the pricing function and conduct counterfactual analyses.
Several studies, such as Choi (2018) and Breuer and Windisch (2019), share the same
objective – to estimate the effect of an accounting information flow on investment while
setting aside strategic information management. In contrast to my paper, managers in
these studies do not maximize short-term prices. In the context of accrual management and
earnings quality, the studies by Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013), Beyer et al. (2018), and
Zakolyukina (2018) combine theory and empirical analysis to examine reporting discretion.
Within this literature, Bertomeu et al. (2018), Bird et al. (2019), and Bertomeu et al.
(2019b) focus specifically on estimating earnings management using cross-sectional properties
of earnings and price. Unlike this paper, their studies do not explicitly model the investment
technology. In other studies, Gerakos and Syverson (2015) develop a model on audit market
and evaluate the effects of two potential policy changes: mandatory audit firm rotation and
an increase in supply concentration if one of the “Big Four” firms exits the market. Zhou
(2017) develops a dynamic disclosure model to study the effect of investors’ learning on
managers’ disclosure decisions. Gayle et al. (2015) analyze various features of executive labor
market, and Li (2019) studies contract design of top executives’ compensation. McClure
(2019) estimates the key determinants of tax avoidance.
Lastly, other structural studies have investigated other channels for reporting discretion,
in the form of strategic selection of information. In Bertomeu et al. (2016), Zhou (2017), and
7

Cheynel and Zhou (2018), managers decide to disclose or withhold information subject to
proprietary costs, implying a potential loss of efficiency when bad information is withheld.
In Bertomeu et al. (2017) and Bertomeu et al. (2019b), managers strategically withhold
information when they are informed (Dye, 1985). These approaches are different from my
work because the manager does not make an investment decision but has discretion on
voluntary disclosures. In line with theoretical work in this area, more analysis of the joint
choice to disclose and invest may help estimate investment efficiency in contexts that involve
voluntary disclosure.

8

Chapter 2
The Model
The model is adapted from Kanodia et al. (2005) (hereafter KSS) and expand into an overlapping generation model. In this section, I briefly describe the model notation, discuss the
core intuition of the theory, and present three benchmark cases, which will be empirically
evaluated later.
Consider an overlapping generation setting in which shareholders buy the firm from the
previous generation, hold it for one period, and sell it to the next generation of investors
at the end of the period. The shareholders delegate decision making to the firm’s manager
who maximizes the current shareholders’ benefit. In each period, the manager chooses an
amount kt to invest in a project. The project generates both short-term and long-term
profits. Short-term profit equals economic revenue net of the cost of investment:
1
1
x̃t = θ̃t kt − ckt2 + η̃t ,
2
2

(2.1)

where θ̃t is the profitability of the project in which the firm invests. The term 12 ckt2 is the
cost of investment, and c is the marginal cost of investment. The profitability parameter θ̃t
follows an i.i.d normal distribution with mean zero and variance σθ2 .1 Before the manager
makes the investment decision, he privately observes the project’s profitability θt . Lastly, η̃t
is the noise in earnings, which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance ση2 . The
earnings noise η̃t and the profitability θ̃t are independent.
The short-term profit x̃t is realized at the end of period t and consumed privately by the
current shareholders, while the long-term profit is not realized until period t + 1. Define the
1

The assumption of a zero mean does not mean that the economy is stationary. A negative profitability
should be viewed as lower than the average. Accordingly, the sample data used in the later estimation are
controlled for firm and year variation and demeaned.

9

long-term profit from the time t project as
1
ỹt = γ θ̃t kt + η̃t ,
2

(2.2)

where γ can be viewed as a combination of earnings multiple, a discount factor or the
correlation between short-term and long-term cash flows. The current shareholders also
receive the long-term profit from last period investment. Define dt as the total cash flow
realized in period t, which is the sum of the long-term profit from last period and the shortterm profit of the current investment

d˜t = x̃t + ỹt−1 .

(2.3)

At the end of period t, the firm issues an accounting report st about investment kt to
the market. The report st is imprecise on kt due to the noise generated in the measurement
process:
s̃t = kt + ˜t ,

(2.4)

where ˜t is the noise in accounting measurement, which is normally distributed with mean
zero and variance σ2 . The distribution of ˜t is common knowledge and ˜t is independent from
θ̃t and η̃t . This noise refers to the random errors generated by the subjective judgements,
conventions and estimations involved in the measurement process. It is the result of the
inherent limitation in financial reporting, not the firm’s intention for mendacity. In other
words, the firm manager cannot intentionally manipulate t .
All investors in the capital market are risk-neutral; the price is then set as the conditional
expectation of the long-term profit yt given the investment report st

p(st ) = E(yt |st ).
10

(2.5)

Given the pricing function, the manager chooses kt to maximize the current shareholders’
total expected payoff. The manager’s optimization problem is:

max E(dt + pt ).
kt

(2.6)

The timeline is in Figure 1.

2.1.

Benchmark cases

There are two sources of information asymmetry in the model: the manager has private
information about the project profitability θt , and the firm’s investment kt is measured with
noise. To better understand how the two frictions affect investment, it is helpful to first
analyze three benchmark cases. I begin with a model where the firm and the market are
perfectly informed, referred to as the first-best scenario. Next, I add a layer of friction
by considering a setting where the profitability θt is common knowledge, but the firm’s
investment is measured with noise. Then, I focus on the other source of friction by imposing
information asymmetry on profitability but allowing the accounting system to measure the
investment precisely.

2.1.1.

Investment with full information

In the first-best benchmark profitability θt is common knowledge, and the firm’s is measured
precisely. The price function is then

pt = E (yt |kt , θt ) = γθt kt ,

11

(2.7)

and the manager’s optimization problem defined in Equation (2.6) can be stated as

k

FB



1 2
= arg max E(dt + pt ) = arg max θt kt − ckt + γθt−1 kt−1 + γθt kt .
kt
2
kt

(2.8)

Investment is obtained by taking the first order condition of Equation (2.8) and is linear in
θt as:
k

FB


=

1+γ
c


θt ,

(2.9)

1+γ
as BtFB , and it refers to the sensitivity of the investment function.
c
Rewrite the first-best price as a function of investment k by substituting θt with kt in
Denote the coefficient

Equation (2.7):
pFB (kt ) =

2.1.2.

cγ 2
k .
1+γ t

(2.10)

Investment with known profitability and imprecise measurement

Next, consider a setting where the project profitability is publicly observed, but the firm’s
investment is measured with noise. As in the main model, the imprecise investment report
st is s̃t = kt + ˜t , with ˜t ∈ N (0, σ2 ). The market knows profitability θt , observes the report
st , and sets the price based on them. In a pure strategy equilibrium, the firm chooses an
investment amount to maximize the expected cash flows, and the market price incorporates
beliefs that are consistent with the investment strategy. The equilibrium investment strategy
is:
1
k KP (θt ) = θt ,
c
Denote the sensitivity

(2.11)

1
as B KP . The equilibrium pricing rule is:
c
pKP (kt ) = cγkt2 .
12

(2.12)

The equilibrium investment sensitivity B KP is lower than B FB . The reason for underinvestment is that the equilibrium price is not set based on the firm’s actual investment.
Instead, the market anticipates an investment level based on θt and sets the price according
to its anticipation. Since the market a priori knows the profitability θt , it can perfectly anticipate how the firm invests given θt . When the market observes a report different from the
anticipated level, it attributes the difference to measurement noise, and investment report is
ignored in the pricing function. Since investment does not affect price, the manager chooses
investment only to maximize the short-term profit, so the firm invests in an myopic way. In
equilibrium, the market rationally anticipates the firm’s under-investment and adjusts the
price accordingly.

2.1.3.

Investment with unknown profitability and perfect measurement

Suppose now that profitability θt is private information of the firm, but the accounting
system generates a precise investment report. In this case, investors update their belief on
profitability θt when they observe the level of investment. Thus, the firm’s investment has an
additional informational value, as denoted in KSS. Even though the firm does not consciously
deliver information about its profitability, investment serves as a signal similar to Spence
(1974): high investment is more attractive to firms with high profitability, and so the level of
investment serves as a signalling device to separate low and high profitability types. Then,
a Spence-like fully revealing signalling equilibrium exists, where investors correctly infer the
profitability θt . In this signalling equilibrium, the firm’s investment function is
k PM =

1 + 2γ
θt ,
c

13

(2.13)

and denote the investment sensitivity B PM =

1 + 2γ
. The capital market’s pricing function
c

can be expressed as a function of investment

pPM (kt ) =

cγ
k2.
1 + 2γ t

(2.14)

1 + 2γ
1+γ
>
= B FB , the firm over-invests for
c
c
any given profitability. The result of over-investment is due to the belief that investment
Since the investment sensitivity B PM =

conveys information about the project’s profitability, where more investment is perceived
by investors as a sign of higher profitability. The firm with a low profitability type is then
inclined to choose a high investment level in an effort to be perceived as a high profitability
type. Investors would be deceived first, but gradually revise their inferences until they
perfectly conjecture the underlying profitability. In equilibrium, the price function is less
sensitive to investment as is shown by comparing pPM (kt ) to pFB (kt ). This is a suboptimal
equilibrium, as the firm over-invests and, once the firm price is fully adjusted, the cost of
over-investment is borne by the current shareholders alone.

2.2.

Unknown profitability and imprecise investment

The benchmark models provide good references, yet in practice both profitability and investment are privately known by a firm’s managers. Managers have access to firm-specific
information that is not available to the capital market, and accounting measurements of investments are rarely 100% accurate. In this setting, KSS show that more efficient equilibria
can be sustained. Below I define the KSS equilibrium and briefly explain the intuition.
Since investors only observe an accounting report st , they can no longer infer the actual
investment amount perfectly. To set the price of the firm, the market forms a Bayesian
posterior belief on the distribution of profitability conditional on the observed report, denoted
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as g(θt |st ). The market also anticipates the firm’s investment function k̂(θt ) for each possible
θt . The market price is then set based on the posterior belief g(θt |st ) and k̂(θt ). The manager
conjectures the price function p̂(st ) and chooses kt to maximize the current shareholders’
expected payoff. In equilibrium, both the conjectured functions are correct: p̂(st ) = p(st )
and k̂(θt ) = k(θt ).
Definition of Equilibrium A noisy signalling equilibrium contains three functions: the
manager’s investment strategy k(θt ), investors’ Bayesian posterior belief g(θt |st ), and a pricing rule p(st ). The equilibrium functions satisfy the following three conditions:
[1] For any given p(st ), the optimal investment satisfies:


Z

∞

p(st )f (st |kt )dst ;

k(θt ) = arg max dt +
kt


(2.15)

−∞

[2] Let h(.) be the pdf of θ. The posterior belief g(θ|s) is given by:
f (st |k(θt )) h(θt )
;
g(θt |st ) = R ∞
f (st |k(z))h(z)dz
−∞

(2.16)

[3] The pricing rule given st is:





Z

∞

θt k(θt )g(θt |st )dθt .

p(st ) = E γθt k(θt )|st = γ

(2.17)

−∞

I focus on the case where kt is linear in profitability parameter θt , which is consistent with the
three benchmark models. The following proposition lists the pricing functions and investment
functions in equilibrium.
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Proposition A linear equilibrium investment strategy takes the form: k(θt ) = B ∗ θt , where
B ∗ is the root of equation:2
r
B 2 σθ2

!
2γ
− 1 − σ2 = 0.
Bc − 1

(2.18)

The market price at time t is a quadratic form of the accounting report:

p(st ) = α0 + α2 s2t ,

(2.19)

B∗c − 1
B ∗ 2 σθ2
,
and
β
=
.
2B ∗
B ∗ 2 σθ2 + σ2
1 + 2γβ 2
1
Equation (2.18) can also be expressed as B ∗ =
. Since 0 < β < 1, and <
c
c
1 + 2γ
∗
B <
, I can compare the equilibrium investment strategy to the benchmark cases:
c
where α0 = (1 − β)B ∗ γσθ2 , α2 =

B KP < B ∗ < B PM .

(2.20)

Equilibrium investment is greater than the myopic investment in Section 2.1.2 but smaller
than the over-investment case when investment is perfectly measured. In fact, when 2β 2 =
1, the equilibrium investment is most efficient: B ∗ = B FB . Since β is a function of B ∗ ,
and there can be more than one root that solves Equation (2.18), I cannot analytically
compare the current investment function with the first-best case. However, since the pricereport relationship is uniquely defined as in Equation (2.19), I can identify empirically the
equilibrium investment and price strategies under the assumption that the entire sample
is generated from the same equilibrium. With the parameter estimates, I can recover the
current investment function, the first-best investment function and the underlying level of
reporting imprecision for the first-best.

2

See Kanodia et al. (2005) for the detailed proof.
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Chapter 3
Estimation
To evaluate the current investment function, I first estimate the parameter set of the model
Φ = {σθ , γ, c, σ , ση } using SMM. The five parameters include the uncertainty in profitability
σθ , the coefficient in long-term cash flow γ, marginal cost of investment c, imprecision in
accounting measurement σ , and noise in earnings ση . In this section, I describe the data set
used in the estimation and identification strategy.

3.1.

Data

Table 1 reports the sample selection process. I employ financial data from Compustat North
America Annual and stock return data from CRSP. The sample begins 1986 and ends in
2015. I only include firms listed in the main three stock exchanges: NYSE, American Stock
Exchange, and Nasdaq. I exclude firms in financial and regulated industries (primary SIC
codes 4800 – 4829, 4910 – 4949 or 6000 – 6999) because my investment model is not likely
to be applicable to regulated or financial firms.
I use capital expenditures (CapEx) as a proxy for firms’ tangible investments, and R&D
expenses for intangible investments. I do not have a theory of the interactions between tangible and intangible assets so, as a simplifying assumption, I estimate the models separately.1
Furthermore, since empirically R&D expenses are missing for many firms, the sample composition will be different for firms involved in both tangible investment and research and
development that are measured in the accounting system. The final CapEx sample consists of 40,469 firm-year observations and 6,116 unique firms, and the R&D sample contains
25,403 firm-year observations and 3,996 unique firms.
Table 2 lists the definitions of related variables and model correspondence. Since both the
1

Similar practice is in Terry et al. (2018), where they estimate their growth model with R&D and selling,
general and administrative expenses separately.
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CapEx and R&D data (and after scaling) have fat tails, I use natural logarithms to transform
the investment distribution, denoted as lnCAPEXP and lnXRDS. Specifically, lnCAPEXP
is calculated as the natural logarithm of capital expenditures scaled by lagged property,
plant and equipment (gross). lnXRDS is defined as the natural log of R&D expense scaled
by sales in the last fiscal year. Because the simulation process generates independent and
identically distributed firms, I run the following regressions to capture firm and year fixed
effects to control for the possible firm or time trend related heterogeneity, as in Hennessy
and Whited (2007):

V ariablesit =

X

βt Y eart +

t

X

γi F irmi + eit ,

(3.1)

i

where V ariables are EPS, Ret, lnCAPEXP, and lnXRDS, while Year t and Firm i are indicator variables. I use the residual values eit in each regression to proxy for the corresponding
variable in the estimation. I trim the residuals at 1% and 99% to remove extreme values.
EPS r, Ret r, CAPEXP r, and XRDS r are the four residual values. Panel B in Table 2
provides the correspondence of between model variables and data variables. I use three variables for the moment calculation. I define shareholders’ return as shareholders’ total gain
divided by the price they paid at t − 1. Shareholders’ earnings dt is represented by EPS r.
CAPEXP r and XRDS r correspond to investment report st . Note that after controlling
for firm-year fixed effects, the variables should be viewed in relative terms. For example, a
negative value of investment CAPEXP r or XRDS r suggests that the investment report is
lower than the sample average.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics. The average total assets for the CapEx sample in
Panel A is $2.8 billion (the median is $337.1 million), very close to the Compustat Universe.
The CapEx sample has a slightly higher MarketCap with median $357.8 million, and lower
Book-to-market ratio of 0.482. Higher market capitalization suggests the sample contains
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relatively larger companies, and low book-to-market ratio indicates the sample firms have
larger growth opportunities. Panel B lists the summary statistics for the R&D investment
sample. The observations are more disperse, as the standard deviations of both Assets and
MarketCap are larger than those in the CapEx sample. The Book-to-market ratio is also
lower, suggesting that firms in the R&D sample have more intangible assets.

3.2.

Identification and estimation

I estimate the parameter set Φ = {σθ , γ, c, σ , ση } using simulated method of moments (SMM)
(McFadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989).2 The process of SMM estimation is as follows.
For each possible parameter set, I simulate a time series of profitability (θt ), investment
report (st ), short-term and long-term earnings (xt and yt ) and price (pt ). I use the simulated
data to compute seven moments related to the three variables as stated in Panel B of Table
2. The optimal parameter set returns the minimal weighted square of distance between the
actual and simulated moments:

Φ̂ = arg min g(Φ)W g(Φ)0 ,

(3.2)

Φ

where g(Φ) is the mean difference between moments from the actual data and moments from
simulated data, and W is the weight matrix. I calculate W as the inverse of the bootstrap
variance-covariance moment matrix.
Identification is achieved by choosing moments that are informative about the structural
parameters. A moment is informative about a parameter if the sensitivity of the moment
to the parameter is high (Strebulaev and Whited, 2012). In other words, a change in the
parameter can “move” the moment. In practice, most of the moments are affected by more
than one parameter, while some moments are more sensitive to specific parameters than
2

Also see Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for identification and detailed procedures for SMM.
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others. I use seven moments to identify five parameters. These moments include the mean
and variance of investments, the variance of earnings, the variance of stock returns, and
covariances between investments, stock returns, and earnings. Because of the multiple roots
in Equation (2.18), most of the relationships are not directly observed. I perform a series
of comparative statics, and here I highlight the intuition behind the sensitivities of each
moment.
The first moment of interest is the imprecision in measurement σθ . This parameter
determines the noise in measuring investment and thus maps positively into the variance
of the investment report. Intuitively, stock price reacts more to the investment report if
the investment report is more precise, which reflects on the negative correlation between
the covariance between stock price and investment report and imprecision σθ . The second
parameter is the long-term earnings multiple γ. A large γ reflects that the cash flows
generated by the project are more concentrated in the future. A higher coefficient of longterm profit increases the variance of stock price and the covariance of investment and stock
price. Moreover, the mean of investment decreases in γ through B. The variance of earnings
and the covariance of earnings and investment also increase in γ through the component of
long-term profit. The third parameter is the marginal cost of investment c, which directly
reduces incentive of investment. Both the variances and covariances moments decrease in c,
with greater effect on the variance of investment. Imprecision in measurement σ is identified
by two covariances jointly: covariance of return and earnings is increasing in σ , while the
covariance of investment and earnings is decreasing in σ . Finanlly, ση is identified by the
variance of return which is only increasing in ση .
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Chapter 4
Results
This section presents the estimation results for capital expenditures and R&D samples, and
evaluates the fit of the model.

4.1.

Parameter estimates

CapEx Sample Panel A of Table 4 reports the parameter estimates from the SMM procedure and their standard errors using the CapEx sample. To interpret the estimates within
the context of the model, I first calculate the investment sensitivity to profitability by plugging the parameter estimates into the polynomial equation of B, as in Equation (2.18). The
equation has only one real root, denoted as B ∗ = 1.05. For every unit change in profitability,
the actual investment in capital expenditures changes by 1.05.
With the magnitude of investment sensitivity B ∗ , I next examine profitability uncertainty and accounting imprecision. The estimate of the uncertainty in profitability σθ is
0.50, comparable to Strebulaev and Whited (2012). Given the investment sensitivity of 1.05,
the standard deviation of actual investment is calculated as 0.525 (1.05 × 0.50). The estimate of accounting imprecision is 0.25. Since the investment report is a combination of
0.25
) of
actual investment and imprecision, an imprecision of 0.25 explains 32% ( √
0.5252 + 0.252
the observed investment report variance. This suggests that for when the investment report
changes by one standard deviation, there is an average of 32% noise, and the actual investment may change only by 68%. Accounting imprecision imposes significant informational
friction. The estimate of the standard deviation of earnings noise is 0.29. Given that the
model implied variation of earnings std(dt ) is 1.15, the imprecision in earnings is about 25%
(0.29/1.15) of the observed variation.
The coefficient γ on the long-term profit is 2.57, indicating that the discounted long21

term payoff is about 79% of the total payoff from the investment. Given that the sample of
CapEx is composed of long-term tangible assets, it is reasonable that more than two thirds
of the revenues are generated in more than one year. The marginal cost of investment c is
4.19. This estimate is within the range of investment cost estimated in Liu et al. (2009)
(even though I do not model accumulation of capital stock). To interpret these estimates, I
compare the short-term profit (loss) xt and long-term profit yt . First, on average the shortterm profit xt is negative for any realized profitability because of the high marginal cost
of investment c. Second, the ratio of short-term and long-term payoff is −1 to 2.14. For
one unit short-term loss, the long-term payoff is 2.14 units. The magnitudes of the payoffs
are increasing in the absolute value of profitability. The net profit is on average positive.
Lastly, the long-term profit yt is found to be more volatile than the short-term payoff xt , as
σy
σx
= 0.89 and
= 1.90. For 100% variation in profitability, the variation in short-term
σθ
σθ
payoff is 89%, while the long-term payoff varies for 190%.

R&D Sample Parameter estimates for the R&D sample are reported in Panel B of Table
4. I use the estimates to calculate the investment sensitivity to profitability from Equation
(2.18). The polynomial equation again has only one real solution: B ∗ = 0.98. This means,
for any realized profitability, the actual investment is 0.98 times of the profitability. The
estimate of standard deviation of profitability σθ is 0.31,1 and thus the actual investment,
which can be expressed as B ∗ θ, has a standard deviation of 0.304. The degree of imprecision
in the investment report σ is 0.05, imposing a noise on the investment report of about 16.2%
0.05
(√
). This suggests that the actual investment variation accounts for 73.8%
0.3042 + 0.052
of the observed investment report. The estimate of the standard deviation of earnings noise
is 0.16. The standard deviation of earnings implied by the model is 1.08, and the noise in
1
Note that the difference in σθ in the two samples is mainly due to the difference in investment data: the
standard deviation of CAPEXP r is 0.6 while the standard deviation of XRDS r is 0.321, and it should not
to be interpreted as a difference in the profitability uncertainty.
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earnings accounts for 15% (0.16/1.08) of the total variation.
The estimates for long-term earnings multiple γ and the marginal cost of investment c are
both larger than those in the CapEx sample. The estimate of γ is 5.83, indicating that profits
are more concentrated in the long-term. Given a realized level of profitability, the long-term
revenue from R&D investment is almost six times larger than its short-term revenue. The
cost of investment c is 12.32, suggesting that R&D investment requires a heavy initial input.
Although the magnitudes of γ and c are larger than those for CapEx, it is not obvious
compare across samples since the R&D sample is more concentrated. To better interpret the
implications of γ and c, I next examine the payoffs generated by R&D investment in both
periods. I find that R&D investment generates a negative average short-term payoff (loss)
and a positive long-term profit. The ratio between short-term and long-term payoffs (xt vs.
yt ) is −1 to 1.16. The net profit is positive, but the difference between the two payoffs is
not as big as that in the CapEx investment. In terms of volatility, I compare the standard
deviation of xt and yt to the variation of R&D profitability, and find that short-term payoff is
σx
= 2.07, and the variation of the long-term
twice more volatile than R&D profitability, as
σθ
σy
payoff is more than five times of the profitability, as
= 5.4.
σθ
It is worth mentioning that the accounting imprecision in capital expenditures is larger
than in R&D. There are two possible explanations. First, under the guidance of the US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), capital expenditures are recorded as assets
on the balance sheet and then depreciated over time, while R&D are expensed. In addition
to the purchase price of the asset, GAAP allows companies to capitalize the associated initial
setup cost, land and equipment improvements, and interest expenses incurred to construct
the asset. The process of capitalizing these items inevitably involves subjective judgement
and estimation that may not accurately reflect the economic facts, resulting in additional
imprecision in reporting investment. On the other hand, GAAP requires that R&D expenditures be fully expensed in the period incurred; thus, there is less discretion involved and
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less reporting imprecision. Second, the limitation in my R&D data also contributes to the
difference in accounting imprecision between the two samples. My R&D sample excludes
firm-year observations with missing R&Ds. Koh and Reeb (2015) point out that 10.5% of
the missing R&Ds have patents (the ratio in my sample is 9.5%), suggesting that some
firms conduct R&D activities without reporting them. In other words, the exclusion of observations without R&D cleans out part of the accounting imprecision in R&D reporting.
As a result, the estimated degree of imprecision in R&D investment in my model is biased
downward. Because the missing R&D observations account for 42% of my total sample, and
when I replace the missing observations with zeros, the imprecision becomes too large for
my model to accommodate.

4.2.

Goodness of fit

Table 5 reports the seven simulated and estimated moments, and Figure 2 displays the
histograms of the three main variables. The model replicates some salient characteristics
of the data. In the CapEx sample, four out of seven pairs of moments are insignificantly
different from each other, including the mean of the investment report, the variance of stock
return, the covariance between stock return and the investment report, and the covariance
between stock return and earnings. The model underestimates the variance of the investment
report (Moment 4), but when I simulate the histogram of the investment report in Panel A
of Figure 2, the difference is not economically significant. The model also underestimates
the variance of earnings (Moment 5). Panel B of Figure 2 plots the histogram of earnings
from actual data and model-simulated data. The actual earnings have more small negative
observations in the range [−5, −1] and fewer small positive observations in [1.5, 5]. The
simulated earnings also contain some large positive outliers. Nevertheless, the discrepancy
is not large.
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For the covariance between earnings and the investment report (Moment 7), the covariance of sample data is 0.118, while the model predicts a negative covariance of −0.003. In
the model, the current investment kt only correlates with the short-term profit of xt in total
earnings. The other part in the earnings yt−1 is not related to current investment since θt is
assumed to be i.i.d.. Because of the negative short-term payoff for any given θ and thus the
negative relation between xt and kt , the covariance between total earnings and investment
must be negative. In practice, however, profitability is likely to be serially correlated, and
so is investment. The long-term profit from last investment yt−1 will be correlated with the
current investment kt . This correlation is positive and larger than that between kt and xt
in absolute value, leading to an overall positive covariance of kt and total profits. In the
model, each generation of investors only observes the current period investment report, and
relaxing the i.i.d. assumption does not affect the analysis. Lastly, the histogram of stock
return is plotted in Panel C of Figure 2. Note that after fixed effect regression, stock return
ret r is distributed around zero, although the actual mean of stock returns should be positive
(sample average return is 2.6 in Table 3). This does not affect my estimation as the mean is
not selected as one of the moments.
Both the model-simulated distribution and the data distribution have heavy right tails.
On the whole, despite the overidentification of matching seven moments with five parameters,
the fit is quite good.2
The fitness of moments for the R&D sample performs similarly well to the CapEx sample.
The seven targeted model and empirical moments for the R&D sample are reported in Panel
B of Table 5. In general, moments are matched nicely – five out of seven moments do
not display significant differences. The difference in the covariance of earnings and the
investment report (Moment 7) is similar to the CapEx sample, due to the i.i.d. assumption
2
Tests of the overidentifying restrictions are not reported for the usual reason of the large sample size
(Acemoglu et al., 2018; Terry et al., 2018). Because the sample size is quite large, any minor deviation from
the moments would lead to a rejection of the overidentifying restrictions.
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for profitability. The model also overestimates the variance of the investment report. Panel
A in Figure 3 plots the distribution of model and data investment reports. R&D investment
in the data distribution has a higher kurtosis than a normal distribution, while the model
assumes a normal distribution. The higher kurtosis also reflects on the variance as a higher
kurtosis generates observations more concentrated around the mean. Panel B in Figure 3
is the earnings distribution, and Panel C plots the shareholders’ return. The two earnings
distributions match each other nicely. The shareholders’ return distribution generated by the
model mimics the heavy right tail in the data but has a higher kurtosis and less asymmetry.
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Chapter 5
Counterfactual Analysis
The parameter estimates allow me to answer four questions. Does the current imprecision in
accounting lead to under- or over-investment? What is the optimal imprecision in accounting
measurement that corresponds to the optimal investment strategy? How much information
is lost due to the imprecision in the accounting report? Lastly, how are investors in the
capital market affected by the imprecision?
These questions are inspired by and test the key message in real-effects theory: more
information is not always desirable. I first quantify the information loss due to estimated
accounting imprecision and the counterfactual degree of imprecision that allows optimal
investment efficiency. Next I compute the difference in ex-ante welfare for investors between
these two imprecision estimates.

5.1.

Optimal imprecision

The benchmark cases in Section 2.1 provide closed form expressions on investment sensitivities B. I calculate B FB , B KP , and B PM using the parameter estimates and report their
values in Table 6. The current imprecision of accounting measurement is 0.25, corresponding to investment sensitivity B ∗ of 1.05. When accounting measurement is precise, firms
over-invest with sensitivity B PM of 1.47, suggesting that the degree of imprecision in the
current accounting system has mitigated over-investment incentive by a substantial amount
of 28.6%. The first-best investment sensitivity B FB is 0.85, which is smaller than the current sensitivity of B ∗ . This suggests that in general, firms still over-invest. Similarly, in
the benchmark case when profitability is known B KP = 0.24. Figure 4 plots the current
investment-profitability relationship compared to the first-best scenario.
I next look for the accounting imprecision that allows the firm to achieve the first-best
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investment B =rB FB . Recall that
! for any parameter set Φ, B is the solution to Equation
2γ
(2.18): B 2 σθ2
− 1 − σ 2 = 0. The optimal accounting imprecision can be
B FB c − 1
calculated by plugging the estimates of σ , γ, c into the equation and substitute B with B FB

σ2 =

2
B FB σ̂θ2

r

!
2γ̂
−1 .
B FB ĉ − 1

(5.1)

The corresponding imprecision σFB is 0.28, which is 36% of the total sample variation,
greater than the current imprecision of 0.25 or 32% of the sample variation. In fact, for
any given investment sensitivity B, Equation (5.1) suggests
that there is a corresponding
r
2γ
accounting imprecision σ as long as Bc − 1 > 0 and
− 1 ≥ 0. I plot the σ − B
Bc − 1
relationship in Figure 5. Investment sensitivity B is decreasing in σ in the trajectory
from the estimated imprecision (0.25) to the optimal imprecision (0.28). Thus, increasing
the imprecision in accounting measurement within an appropriate range can mitigate overinvestment and increase investment efficiency.
In the R&D Sample, the current investment sensitivity B ∗ is 0.98. When accounting
measurement is precise, firms invest with B PM as 1.03, suggesting that a fully precise measure
in R&D would worsen over-investment by 4.9%. The first-best investment sensitivity B FB is
0.55, smaller than the current sensitivity B ∗ . Thus, as with the capital expenditures sample,
firms over-invest in R&D, and the degree of over-investment is more significant than in the
CapEx sample. Given the substantial cost of investment in R&D, the myopic investment
under the situation of known profitability is highly inelastic, with B KP being only 0.08.
Figure 6 plots the sample investment function and the first-best investment function.
I plot the investment-imprecision relationship in Figure 7. The sample imprecision estimate is 0.05, or 16.2% of the sample variation, as indicated in the round dot. To achieve
the first-best investment level, imprecision of the accounting measurement should increase
to 0.11, which corresponds to 35.7% of the sample variation, greater than the sample im28

precision by 19.5 percentage points. Consistent with the CapEx sample, the trajectory of
(σ , B) is decreasing from the current investment to the first-best investment.

5.2.

Information loss

In all the benchmark cases, the market participants either observe or correctly conjecture
the actual investment, and correctly infer the profitability of the project in equilibrium. In
the current framework, however, the investment report is contaminated by accounting noise,
and thus the market’s inference on profitability is no longer perfect.
To measure information loss, I follow the spirit of the earnings-management literature
and focus on the capital market’s unresolved uncertainty about the profitability θ upon
observing the investment report s.1 Define the measure of residual uncertainty as

σθ|s

p
V ar(θ|s)
.
≡
σθ

(5.2)

If investment report s is accurate, investors can perfectly infer the value of profitability θ
from the report. In this case, no uncertainty remains since V ar(θ|s) = 0 and thus σθ|s = 0.
For the benchmark case with unknown profitability and perfect measurement, the residual
uncertainty is zero. If s contains no information about θ at all, the uncertainty on profitability
p
will not change before or after observing the report s. In this case, V ar(θ|s) = σθ , and the
measure of residual uncertainty σθ|s = 1. In fact, the residual uncertainty σθ|s is increasing
in the accounting imprecision, ranging from zero to one.
Table 7 reports the results. I compare the residual uncertainty estimated using the
data and the residual uncertainty using optimal imprecision. The remaining uncertainty on
profitability after observing the imprecise investment report is 38.9%. This suggests that
information asymmetry caused a loss of 38.9% of information. Using optimal imprecision will
1

See Beyer et al. (2018); Bertomeu et al. (2019a), and Bertomeu et al. (2019b).
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cause a further loss in information of 21.9 percentage points, leading to a residual uncertainty
of 60.8%. The large magnitude of residual uncertainty further supports the argument that
achieving the optimal investment efficiency does not require precise measurement.
The R&D sample shows a similar pattern. A 21.1% residual uncertainty indicates that
to the capital market, the imprecise investment report contains 21.1% less information on
profitability. Using optimal imprecision would lead to a residual uncertainty of 74.2%, a
more significant loss in information compared to the capital expenditures investment.

5.3.

Welfare change

Recall that in the benchmark cases, the cost of deviating from the first-best scenario is
solely borne by the firm’s owner because the market fully anticipates actual investment and
thus profitability. This is no longer the case in the current noisy signaling equilibrium.
Unable to perfectly conjecture the actual investment, the market has to bear part of the
cost from over-investment. Thus, it is worthwhile to investigate the change in welfare for the
firm’s shareholders and for capital market investors (shareholders in the next generation)
by comparing the current equilibrium to the first-best. Note that unlike the literature in
earnings management (Fischer and Verreechia, 2000; Bertomeu et al., 2019b), the firm’s
owner does not necessarily benefit from the accounting noise in this framework. Recall that
the owner’s objective function consists of the current period profit and the price of selling the
firm. Although the firm is sold at a ‘premium’ because the capital market cannot perfectly
infer the project profitability, the firm’s owner also incurs a loss in the short-term profit xt
due to over-investment. Thus, it is not clear whether the selling price benefit can fully offset
the loss in the short-term profit.
Define the difference between the equilibrium ex-ante expected welfare and first-best
welfare for the current shareholders and the market investors as ∆WF irm and ∆WM arket ,
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respectively:
∆WF irm ≡

FB
E[xt + pt − (xFB
)]
t +p
p
,
FB )
V ar(xFB
+
p
t

(5.3)

and
E[pFB − pt ]
∆WM arket ≡ p
V ar(pFB )

(5.4)

Table 8 presents the results. In the CapEx sample, the firm’s owner benefits from the
noisy equilibrium by 0.4%, yet this is not significantly different from zero. However, market
investors overpay by 4.2%. On the whole, the results suggest that the firm can offload all the
cost of over-investment to the market. For the R&D sample, both the firm and the market
are worse off compared to the first-best. The firm owner’s welfare drops by 12.1%, and the
market’s welfare is reduced by 22%. Both parties incur greater losses than in the CapEx
sample because of the significant amount of over-investment in R&D. Although the firm
owner’s welfare drops, the noisy equilibrium still allows the firm to transfer a large portion
of the cost to the market.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this study, I incorporate information on stock prices, investment reports, and earnings to
estimate the real effects of accounting measurement under the framework of Kanodia et al.
(2005). The main conclusion is that, the imprecision in measuring investment under the US
accounting system has significantly reduced the degree of over-investment, but compared to
the first-best, firms on average over-invest. Counterfactual analyses show that increasing
the level of imprecision in CapEx investment by 4 percentage points of the profitability
uncertainty can improve the market’s welfare by 4.2%. Allowing the noise in R&D investment
to increase by 19.5 percentage points can raise the next generation of shareholders’ welfare
by 22%.
My study contributes to the literature by quantifying the real effects of imprecision in
accounting measurement and its impact on investors’ welfare. Such quantification analysis
is important to the application of the real-effects theory. As stated in Kanodia and Sapra
(2016), “identifying the real economic consequences of alternative accounting standards is of
first-order importance to the accounting discipline.” However, such identification has been
difficult to empirical research due to the lack of observable proxies. As a result, the real-effects
theory stays largely untested, limiting its application to guide public policy on alternative
disclosure standards. Structural estimation is well suited for this task, as it can quantify the
predictions of a fully specified model that directly studies the effect of accounting choices on
the behavior of the real economy. My paper is among the first to meet the demand.
Several unique features of my approach are worth emphasizing. First, I try to keep the
model simple by avoiding numerical dynamic estimation or heavy computational intensity
such that the model can be applied to many samples and different settings. Second, the
model assumes a linear production function and no asset accumulation. This simplification
is imposed to illustrate the core trade-off in closed-form expressions. Third, I use the model
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to estimate the effects on information loss and welfare changes for both parties, providing
an assessment of the economic importance of such a trade-off.
This paper serves as an initial attempt to quantify the real effects of accounting measurement. I focus on a simple semi-dynamic model where shareholders are fully myopic.
Future researchers can extend the analysis to capture more frictions in the dynamic relation
between accounting measurement and investment, and possibly with extra signals such as
earnings. Moreover, this easy-to-implement methodology can be applied to evaluate certain
accounting rules. For instance, development expenditures are capitalized in the UK after
the adoption of IFRS; this provides a more precise measurement of firms’ productive R&D
investments. My model will be suitable to this setting, as it can evaluate the effect of this
decomposition of R&D reporting on corporate investment efficiency.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
This table presents the sample selection process. Both CapEx and R&D sample start with the compustatCRSP merged dataset. I require non-missing beginning-of-the-year property, plant, and equipment (gross)
for CapEx sample and non-missing lagged SALE for R&D sample.

CapEx

R&D

115,885

115,885

(971)

(971)

Missing stock return data

(36,012)

(36,012)

Missing investment data

(11,913)

(39,623)

(7,866)

(2,999)

(14,922)

(8,653)

Missing residuals from fixed-effect regressions

(1,209)

(737)

Trim variables at 1% and 99%

(2,523)

(1,577)

40,469

25,403

Compustat/CRSP Observations from 1986-2015
Less:

Missing earnings data

Financial and regulated firms
Not listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ

Final Sample Size
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Table 2: Data Definitions and Variable Correspondence
This table presents data definitions for variables used in the estimation. Panel A describes the variable
definition and data sources. Panel B summarizes the correspondence between model variables and data
variables.

Panel A. Variable Definition
Variables

Definitions

Assets

Total Assets in millions (Compustat AT ).
One plus buy-and-hold return from nine months before to three
P
months after the fiscal-year-end date (exp( i log(1 + reti ))).

Ret

EPS

Income before extraordinary items divided by common shares
outstanding (Compustat IB × CSHO), measured in millions.

MarketCap

Market capitalization in millions (Compustat MKVALT ).

Book-to-Market

Common equity divided by MarketCap (Compustat CEQ/M KV ALT ).

lnCAPEXP

The natural log of capital expenditures scaled by lagged property, plant,
and equipment (gross). (Compustat log(CapEx/l.P P EGT )).

lnXRDS

The natural log of R&D expense scaled by lagged sales
(Compustat XRD/l.SALE).

EP S r

The residual values of EPS regression on firm and year fixed effects.

Ret r

The residual values of Ret regression on firm and year fixed effects.

CAP EXP r

The residuals of lnCAPEXP regression on firm and year fixed effects.

XRDS r

The residual of lnXRDS regression on firm and year fixed effects.
Panel B. Variable Correspondence

Variables
Accounting report
Earnings
Shareholders’ return

Model Correspondence

Data Correspondence

st

CAP EXP r, XRDS r

dt
pt + dt
pt−1

EP S r
Ret r
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics of the samples. Panel A reports the statistics for CapEx sample
and Panel B summarizes the R&D sample. The definitions are provided in Table 2. The last three variables
in each panel is are used in the estimation.

Variables

N

Panel A. CapEx Sample
Assets
40,469
Ret
40,469
EPS
40,469
Market Cap
40,440
Book-to-market
40,422
lnCAPEXP
40,469
Data used in estimation:
40,469
EPS r
Ret r
40,469
CAPEXP r
40,469
Panel B. R&D Sample
Assets
25,403
Ret
25,403
EPS
25,403
Market Cap
25,381
Book-to-market
25,378
lnXRDS
25,403
Data used in estimation:
EPS r
25,403
Ret r
25,403
25,403
XRDS r

Mean

SD

25%

50%

75%

2,810
2.607
0.871
3,298
0.600
−2.289

7,937
3.891
1.822
10,204
0.514
0.886

84.72
0.524
−0.049
77.31
0.278
−2.811

337.1
1.161
0.651
357.8
0.482
−2.275

1,566
2.654
1.687
1,646
0.781
−1.735

0.014
−0.071
0.002

1.217
3.302
0.600

−0.492
−1.903
−0.351

0.031
−0.565
0.003

0.568
0.673
0.356

3,221
2.762
0.838
4,117
0.557
−2.833

10,363
4.320
1.741
13,524
0.473
1.444

70.58
0.510
−0.104
76.82
0.255
−4.010

282.4
1.162
0.577
345.8
0.445
−2.963

1,420
2.709
1.650
1,725
0.722
−1.916

0.016
−0.075
−0.003

1.087
3.614
0.321

-0.462
−2.041
−0.126

0.0327
−0.557
−0.005

0.523
0.755
0.117

36

Table 4: Parameter Estimates
This table presents the estimates of the parameter set Φ using SMM. The five parameters are {σθ , γ, c, σ , ση }
with descriptions listed in Column 3. Column 4 reports their estimated values with standard errors from
bootstrap in Column 5. Panel A reports estimates based on CapEx Sample, and Panel B is for R&D sample.

Panel A. CapEx Sample
#

Parameter

1.

σθ

2.

Description

Value

St. Errors

Uncertainty in profitability

0.50

(0.005)

γ

Multiple of long-term earnings

2.57

(0.076)

3.

c

Marginal cost of investment

4.19

(0.057)

4.

σ

Measurement imprecision

0.25

(0.003)

5.

ση

Earnings noise

0.29

(0.008)

Value

St. Errors

Panel B. R&D Sample
#

Parameter

Description

1.

σθ

Uncertainty in profitability

0.31

(0.010)

2.

γ

Multiple of long-term earnings

5.83

(0.508)

3.

c

Marginal cost of investment

12.32

(0.413)

4.

σ

Measurement imprecision

0.05

(0.013)

5.

ση

Earnings noise

0.16

(0.011)
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Table 5: Model and Data Moments
This table reports the values of seven targeted moments calculated from actual data and the model. Column
3 is the empirical moment, while Column 4 uses data simulated from the model. The last column reports
the t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the difference between each pair of moments equals zero. Panel
A reports the moment values based on the CapEx Sample, and Panel B is about the R&D sample.

Panel A. CapEx Sample
#

Moments

Data

Model

t-stat

1.

Variance of stock returns

10.903

11.040

−0.68

2.

Covariance of stock returns and investment reports

0.003

0.022

−0.96

3.

Mean of investment reports

0.002

0.001

0.34

4.

Variance of investment reports

0.360

0.345

4.08

5.

Variance of earnings

1.481

1.309

6.44

6.

Covariance of stock returns and earnings

0.004

0.043

−1.44

7.

Covariance of earnings and investment reports

0.118

−0.003

23.36

12.990

13.064

0.24

0.001

0.013

1.02

−0.005

−0.003

0.67

Panel B. R&D Sample
1.

Variance of stock returns

2.

Covariance of stock returns and investment reports

3.

Mean of investment reports

4.

Variance of investment reports

0.098

0.103

3.39

5.

Variance of earnings

1.167

1.182

0.58

6.

Covariance of stock return and earnings

0.081

0.047

−0.96

7.

Covariance of earnings and investment reports

0.001

−0.029

−7.36
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Table 6: Counterfactual Analysis
This table presents the results of counterfactual analysis. Results for CapEx Sample is reported in Panel A
and Results for the R&D Sample. Column One list the models including the noisy signaling (the current
investment strategy) and the three benchmark cases. Column Two is the expressions of the investment
sensitivity B in each benchmark case. Column Three is the value of B according to the parameter estimated
by the model. Column Four is the level of imprecision in accounting in the noisy q
signal model given the
investment sensitivity B. The level of imprecision is calculated using: σ2 = B 2 σθ2

− 1 . Assume

2

β=

B σθ2
B 2 σθ2 +σ2

2γ
Bc−1

. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Panel A. CapEx Sample
Scenarios

Noisy Signalling
First-Best Investment

B

σ

Model

Estimate

Corresponding estimate

1 + 2γβ 2
c

1.05

0.25

(0.011)

(0.003)

0.85

0.28

(0.023)

(0.004)

1+γ
c

Known Profitability

1
c

Perfect Measurement

1 + 2γ
c

0.24
(0.004)
1.47
(0.044)

Panel B. R&D Sample
Scenarios

Noisy Signalling
First-Best Investment

B

σ

Model

Estimate

Corresponding estimate

1 + 2γβ 2
c

0.98

0.05

(0.024)

(0.013)

0.55

0.11

(0.059)

(0.006)

0.08

-

1+γ
c

Known Profitability

1
c

Perfect Measurement

1 + 2γ
c

(0.003)
1.03
(0.117)
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Table 7: Information Loss
This table reports the estimates of
presidual uncertainty in profitability and price. The residual uncertainty in
V ar(θ|s)
profitability is defined as σθ|s ≡
. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Panel A displays
σθ
results for the CapEx sample and Panel B is for the R&D sample.

Residual Uncertainty σθ|s
Estimated imprecision

Optimal Imprecision

Panel A. CapEx Sample
Estimates

0.389

0.608

Std. error

(0.002)

(0.012)

Panel B. R&D Sample
Estimates

0.158

0.541

Std. error

(0.018)

(0.000)

Table 8: Welfare change
This table reports the change in ex-ante welfare compared to First-best model. The change in welfare for
FB
E[xt + pt − (xFB
)]
t +p
p
the firm’s current shareholders is defined as ∆WF irm ≡
. The change in investors’
FB )
V ar(xFB
+
p
t
E[pFB − pt ]
welfare is ∆WM arket ≡ p
. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
V ar(pFB )

Welfare Change
Firm

Market

∆F irm

∆M arket

Panel A. CapEx Sample
Estimates

0.004

−0.042

Std. error

(0.016)

(0.003)

Panel B. R&D Sample
Estimates

−0.121

−0.220

Std. error

(0.014)

(0.023)
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Figure 1: Model Timeline
t−1

Shareholders purchase the firm for
pt−1 .

t+1

t

Manager observes
θt and chooses
k(θt ).

Long-term profit
yt−1 and shortterm profit xt are
realized.
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Accounting system
generates a report st .
Shareholders sell the
firm for p(st ).

Figure 2: Data and Simulated Variables – CapEx Sample
This figure includes the histograms of data simulated variables for the CapEx sample. In Panel A,
investment report for data sample uses variable CAPEXP r, which corresponds to st in the model. Panel
B plots the distributions of earnings, which is EPS r in the data and dt in the model. Panel C displays
the shareholders’ return distributions. The data histogram is from the variable Ret r and the simulated
pt + dt
variable is calculated as
. To better compare the distribution, I demeaned the simulated return data.
pt−1
See Panel B of Table 2 for the definitions.

(a) Accounting Report

(b) Earnings

(c) Shareholders’ return
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Figure 3: Data and Simulated Variables – R&D Sample
This figure includes the histograms of data simulated variables for the R&D sample. In Panel A, investment
report for data sample uses variable XRDs r, which corresponds to st in the model. Panel B plots the
distributions of earnings, which is EPS r in the data and dt in the model. Panel C displays the shareholders’
return distributions. The data histogram is from the variable Ret r and the simulated variable is calculated
pt + dt
as
. See Panel B of Table 2 for the definitions.
pt−1

(b) Earnings

(a) Investment Report

(c) Shareholders’ return
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Figure 4: Investment Strategy – CapEx Sample
This figure displays the investment functions. The solid line is the estimated investment function using
CapEx sample with a slope B = 1.05. The dotted line is the optimal investment function as in the first-best
benchmark case, which can also be achieved when σ = 0.28. The slope of the optimal investment function
is B FB = 0.85.

Investment function k( )

1

First-Best
CapEx Sample

0.5

0

-0.5
-0.5

0

0.5

Profitability
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1

Figure 5: Imprecision and Investment Sensitivities – CapEx Sample
This figure plots the relation between accounting measurement
noise σ and investment sensitivity B,
!
r
2γ
calculated using Equation (2.18): B 2 σθ2
− 1 − σ2 = 0, where the parameters σθ , γ, and c are
Bc − 1
substituted with estimates from the CapEx sample. The round dot is the estimated relation, with σ of
0.25 and B of 1.05. The diamond dot corresponds to the accounting measurement noise σ = 0.28 and the
sensitivity of the optimal investment function, B FB = 0.85.

Investment Sensitivity B

1.6
1.4
1.2
Estimated (32%, 1.05)

1
Optimal (36%, 0.85)

0.8
0.6

0

12.9

25.8

38.7

/ s (%)
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51.6

64.5

77.4

Figure 6: Investment Strategy – R&D Sample
This figure displays the investment functions. The solid line is the estimated investment function using
R&D sample with a slope B = 0.98. The dotted line is the optimal investment function as in the first-best
benchmark case, which can also be achieved when σ = 0.28. The slope of the optimal investment function
is B FB = 0.55.
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R&D Sample
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-0.2

-0.2

0

0.2

Profitability

46
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Figure 7: Imprecision and Investment Sensitivity – R&D Sample

Investment Sensitivity B

This figure plots the relation between accounting measurement
! noise σ and R&D investment sensitivity B.
r
2γ
It is calculated using Equation (2.18): B 2 σθ2
− 1 − σ2 = 0, where the parameters σθ , γ, and c
Bc − 1
are substituted with estimates from the R&D sample. The round dot is the estimated relation, with σ of
0.05 and B of 0.98. The diamond dot corresponds to the accounting measurement noise σ = 0.11 and the
sensitivity of the optimal investment function, B FB = 0.55.
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